It is not that I am viewing the Bible with rose-colored glasses, you are viewing human nature with rose-colored glasses. So, therefore, it seems like mental intentions are the things of moral evaluation? God told me to drive 100mph in a 30mph zone. Legalism is a degenerate form of not-lawlessness. Ok, that was quite a bit of digression. Wikipedia, for example, records the sacred books of 55 different religions. The end result of the argument is not that God exists for certain, but that God probably exists; that it is likely that God exists.
You can remember the name by thinking of how 'divine' refers to 'God' and 'command' refers to 'laws': divine commands are God's laws. Do we accept , , , , , , some branch of , or something completely different? I refer you to , starting at 35m. Unless divine command theory can first demonstrate that it is the most appropriate view of ethics, one cannot assume that it is correct to prove anything else. . These are questions we'll address in the next two sections on egoism.
And he abandoned them because they did nothing, only to find that he had jumped ship to another g0d that does nothing. Divine command theory is an approach to ethics that views God as the source of moral laws. So what now separates God's Commands from the laws of the local legislature? Advocates would argue, however, that this is not the case. Believing that death is not the end, but a new beginning, may help officers who practise religion deal with pain and suffering. It was a subsistence-based economy; famines were frequent. As a Consequentialist form of Ethics, Divine Command Ethics is a Personal concpetion of Ethics.
Perhaps there is a conservation of evil-good that can simply be violated for much larger periods of time. If there are any objective moral standards at all, then a god can be either good or evil, and the assessment of a god's character would depend upon appealing to standards independent of any god's commands, opinions, statements, nature, or character. It seems obviously true that he could choose them, at least from the logically possible worlds. Second, what about the times when God commands the Israelites to slaughter their enemies down to the very last man, woman and child? You seem to take issues with the things that every mainstream Christians has no problem with. Ayn Rand makes this point in Atlas Shrugged.
Slavery and why it was not obviously outlawed needs explaining. The natural purpose of the eye is to see. However, there is ambiguity in the way in which some scripture is interpreted. Person B makes an attack on person A. Why these rules rather than those rules.
William of Ockham, for example, is sure that killing is necessary because it is morally required. For an atheist or agnostic, it can be harder to pinpoint the origins of how morality came to be. God commands only things that are good, and he would never command a person to act immorally. They should be read as such. One kind of intellectual maturity means being able to see the good and the bad in something simultaneously. Hence the frequency of the first problem mentioned. All three ethicists belonged to diverse types of ethics, namely Utilitarianism Mill , Deontological Ethics Kant and Divine Command Ethics Al-Ghazâlî.
As a Deontological form of Ethics, Divine Command Ethics is a Social conception of Ethics. But these allegedly mutually exclusive options can be combined: the divine assistance can come in the form of creating a world of type 1 instead of type 2. Divine Command Ethics has its strong and weak points which are both of practical and theoretical significance. Have you ever been viewed in the worst possible light by another human being? This is one of the most obvious criticisms of apologetic approaches and what Stark looks to combat. As Carrier goes on to point out, if we can, using our God given rationality, decipher morality in some secular sense, as we do on a daily basis, if this was not in some way accurate, then it appears God would be setting things up to deceive us as to what is good or bad.
In defence, I shall begin by looking at the modified theory as proposed by Robert Adams. Could you shed some light on the precise nature of the comparison you are making, here? Both can be considered valid arguments of the amount of control God has over the moral standards of the universe, but it is much easier to attempt to disprove something that has no concrete evidence. Although Sullivan finds much to agree with here, he offers two particular criticisms of Adams's version of divine command theory. In the former case, we can say that God is not good, and in the latter we can say that God is not God. Officers who believe in God are also able to look at these situations and find comfort in the belief that God has a plan for everyone, even those who have been unfairly victimized. This is simply the magic context wand. Go find another dance partner.
Consider this: if you want to drive safely, you ought to obey traffic regulations. God and Good are semantically equivalent. Not to act according to his commands is to act contrary to a loving way, and to act in this manner is wrong. Is a person supposed to read the Bible and make their own decisions about what the passages mean and what they are telling humans are the right and wrong ways of life? The Christian Thinktank guy Glenn has presented evidence I find compelling, arguing that what Biblical slavery is not analogous to New World slavery on several important fronts. Keep watch on yourself, lest you too be tempted. God tells man to ram another vehicle at 100mph Various dates.
In fact, he's remembering how he's usually thought of belief in God as the same as the belief in unicorns, leprechauns or sea monsters. There are two attempts to do this which Rachels outlines: the divine command theory and the theory of natural law. Humans could, as rational beings, understand the moral values that determine right and wrong and choose how they should live. The divine command theory postulates that morality is based directly on the commands of God himself. Again this is the difficulty we have in deriving statements of what ought to be the case from statements of what is the case.